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SYSTEM STAFF COLLEGE

PRELIMINARY SCOPING REPORT

ANALYZING AND ENGAGING NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN THE FIELD

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1. INTRODUCTION

The effectiveness of United Nations field operations, whether development programmes, humanitarian aid, political missions or rule of law interventions, are increasingly contingent on UN staff's capacity to analyse and strategically engage non-state armed groups.[1] The proliferation and evolving hybridity of these organisations blurs simple distinctions between politically oriented insurgents and organized crime or gangs.[2] Adding to this complexity is the emergence of community-based groups that are perceived to play positive roles by their communities, for example, providing security to local neighbourhoods when the state is absent.[3] Moreover, NATO's recent intervention in Libya, which supported the groups rising up against Qaddafi's government, illustrates both the prominence of non-state armed groups and the international community's complex relationship with them.[4]

Meeting this challenge requires UN staff to be adept at both understanding and negotiating with these non-state groups. To date, learning in the UN on this topic has been decentralized and disjoined – reducing the effectiveness of staff and the potential of experience sharing across the organization. In response, the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC)[5] has introduced a learning initiative to advance UN staff capacity to understand and strategically engage non-state armed groups. The purpose of this report is to survey the available policy and academic resources for developing this learning initiative: Analyzing and Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in the Field. Given that it is a preliminary survey, it is not comprehensive; rather, its objective is to frame the challenge, highlight critical resources, and suggest potentially successful approaches to address it (for a description of the scoping process see Annex A).

2. A CHALLENGE ACROSS THE UN SYSTEM

In 2010, violence resulted in the death of more than 1.5 million people, which makes it one of the leading causes of death worldwide for individuals aged 15-44 years old.[6] While the cause of these fatalities range from inter-personal violence, including intimate partner violence, to organized (collective) armed violence, three trends in the global pattern of armed violence suggests that understanding and engaging non-state armed groups will continue to be critical for UN effectiveness. [7]

The first trend continues from the 1990s when UN missions and agencies adapted to the shift in armed violence from wars between states to armed conflict within states.[8] In the intervening two decades, civil wars and the armed groups driving them have become the predominant form of war in the world system.[9] In the last decade alone, the number of groups involved in civil conflicts has quadrupled, most dramatically in East and South Asia.[10] All indications suggest this trend will continue.[11] In order to distinguish between different types of non-state armed groups, the organizations[12] embroiled in civil wars are designated in this report as civil war armed groups.[13]

The second trend is a more recent shift in the patterns of violence discussed in the UN Secretary-General's 2009 report on armed violence:[14] during the last five years 90 per cent of violent deaths in the world took place outside situations conventionally understood as armed conflict or terrorism.[15] For instance, in 2011 the death toll in Afghanistan was 3,131, only one third of the violent deaths recorded in Tanzania – 10,357.[16] While data on this phenomenon is still improving, converging evidence suggests criminal organizations are responsible for a significant proportion – if not the majority – of this "unconventional" armed violence.[17] In Brazil, for example, 57 per cent of the homicides in 1991 were linked to warfare between drug gangs.[18] Meanwhile in El Salvador, which has experienced the highest rate of violent deaths in the world (including the conflict in Syria), homicides fell by two-thirds in 2012 after two of the country's largest gangs, each with tens of thousands of members, declared a ceasefire.[19] Unlike "traditional" insurgents, which explicitly vie for national or regional dominance, these non-conventional armed groups[20] create parallel systems of power.[21]

The impact of organized crime on state fragility and community resilience has become increasingly clear.[22] The UN has, however, traditionally categorized organized crime or

gangs solely as a law enforcement issue, in part, because they were deemed to have minimal political impact. This approach is changing as it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between violence driven by conflict or crime. Colombia's four-decade civil war illustrates, for instance, that over time criminal activities and their related violence often become indistinguishable from politically oriented conflict.[23] Moreover, mounting evidence suggests that this "concurrent presence" is not benign, accompanied by systematic corruption of local and national governance structures – police, judiciary and legislators.[24] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the UN have identified the corrosive effect of organised crime as a critical factor undermining the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and increasing state fragility.[25]

The final trend relates to the expanding scope of groups organized by communities to provide security in fragile cities or states. While there is compelling evidence that non-state armed groups drive many transnational threats – international terrorism, human trafficking, arms trading – other non-state groups are offering protection to civilians and "can co-operate with the international community in enhancing civilian protection and humanitarian support in fragile and conflict-affected environments."[26] Nevertheless, the contentious relationship between the state and this type of organization is demonstrated in the case of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in the Western Cape of South Africa. PAGAD began as a loose coalition of anti-drug and anti-gang groups that were predominately, but not exclusively, Muslim.[27] At its inception in 1995, the group had significant community support as the state's efforts to combat an increase in crime was perceived as inadequate. Over the next five years, however, the organization's increasingly violent vigilante attacks, including drive-by shootings and grenade attacks, and its alleged association with radicalized religious ideology transformed public perception. The shift from neighbourhood champion to target of government anti-terrorism efforts did not, however, completely undermine the community's support. This case illustrates the complex relationship that often exists between the groups perpetrating urban violence and the communities affected. It also underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the particularities of a group and the conflict environment in which it operates.[28]

Despite the unique nature of each type group, however, these trends are often interconnected with groups often exhibiting aspects of each. Nevertheless, group leaders face similar challenges – resource mobilization, membership recruitment and organizational cohesion. As a consequence, UN experience analysing and engaging non-state armed groups can inform, and be informed by, the experience of the entire spectrum of group types.

3. EMERGING PHENOMENON, OLD FRAMEWORKS

The increased prominence of hybrid or non-conventional armed groups, which differ considerably from civil war armed groups, has widespread policy and programmatic implications for the UN system. It is most pertinent to field staff addressing, for instance: DDR, the protection of civilians, mediation and preventive diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, crime prevention, small arms proliferation and youth at risk.[29]

Despite the critical role played by non-state armed groups, however, the "war on terrorism" and the subsequent criminalization of engagement with these groups has restricted UN staff efforts in the field and learning on this topic.[30] These restrictions derive from national legislation (most prominently the USA Patriot Act) that strives to restrict "material support" to proscribed groups. This development is ironic as it is increasingly clear – even for the governments imposing these restrictions – that engaging with these groups is politically and practically necessary. [31] Nevertheless, the result has created reticence to formally addressing this issue in headquarters, relegating negotiations to field staff.[32] This strategy reduces the potential of staff learning and has, on occasion, resulted in "a failure to train staff on the ground in negotiating skills...[and] as a result humanitarian negotiators often lack adequate understanding of the NSAGs [non-state armed groups] that they are seeking to engage with and are ill-prepared for the process."[33]

Learning these analytical and practical skills is, however, neither straightforward nor a natural outcome of field experience. For this reason, this report argues that without a structured learning initiative that pools the substantial, yet diverse, experience across the UN system the criminalization process will continue to negatively impact UN staff capacity in the field (see the report's conclusion for a proposed outlined for such an initiative).

4. EXISTING POLICY, RESEARCH AND TRAINING

Humanitarian actors have pioneered UN policy development for engaging with non-state armed groups in the field.[34] This is in large part due to the nature of humanitarian action and the necessity of negotiating with non-state groups in order to, for instance, gain access to vulnerable populations or secure commitments on goals fulfilling the rights of children in humanitarian emergencies.[35] Nevertheless, other UN actors also have significant experience analyzing and interacting with armed groups, whether it is demobilizing combatants, facilitating early recovery, mediating local and national conflicts, curtailing small arms proliferation or advancing community security initiatives.[36] The continuing proliferation and reach of armed groups has made engagement – whether analysis or direct negotiation – increasingly common. For example, UNDP's development efforts in Myanmar (Burma) necessitate a detailed understanding of the myriad of armed groups present in the country and the nature of their relationship with local communities.[37]

Humanitarian negotiations are usually distinguished from either political or development engagements. While this distinction is important to maintain in the field, understanding and articulating the international legal and normative frameworks informing engagement with non-state armed groups is important for all UN staff addressing this issue in the field. Moreover, despite the distinctions analytical frameworks and strategic considerations rely upon similar theoretical and methodological approaches in evaluating an organization's morphology, deployment of violence, cohesion patterns and resourcing strategies. The following table summarizes the available policy guidance within the UN system (for a more detailed list, see ANNEX C and the reference list).

UN ORGANIZATION	REFERENCE	MAIN CONTENT
OCHA	Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (2006)	• Humanitarian Negotiations: Motivations and Partners • Framing the Negotiations • Working Towards More Effective Negotiations • Negotiating on Specific Issues
UNICEF	Programme Guidance Note on Engaging with Non-State Entities in Humanitarian Action (2011)	• Applicable International Legal and Normative Framework • Decision to engage with NSEs • Modalities of engagement • Risk management
DPKO	Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping (2014)	• Applications of local perceptions • Tools for gathering local perceptions • Risks, constraints and challenges
DPKO	United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014)	• Support against serious and organized crime • Support in the provision of security during electoral processes
UNHCR	Operational Guidelines on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum (2006)	• The process for disarmament • Identification of combatants • Separation and internment of combatants • Refugee status determination of former combatants • Acts by refugees incompatible with the civilian and humanitarian • Combatants who do not renounce
	Dangerous liaisons? A historical review of UNHCR's engagement with non-state armed actors (2012)	• Engagement and UNHCR • Engagement and NSAAs • How engagement occurs • When engagement fails
UN Secretary-General Reports	Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities (2009)	• Engaging the parties early • Managing spoilers [including non-state armed groups]

POLICY GUIDANCE

To date, the most advanced UN policy and programme guidance that specifically addresses analyzing and engaging non-state armed groups has been developed by UNICEF and OCHA. The guidance provided by UNICEF's "Programme Guidance Note on Engaging with Non-State Entities in Humanitarian Action" focuses heavily on the legal and policy framework underpinning the structured decision-making approach for engagement by humanitarians.[38] Like other humanitarian guidance,[39] engagement is framed by three provisions of international law: international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL); and international criminal law (ICL).[40]

The guidance sets out the legal and normative case that IHL underpins humanitarian engagement with non-state entitles by establishing the right for impartial humanitarian organizations to offer their services to all parties in conflict. The policies argue that IHL should bind all parties to non-international armed conflicts, whether state actors or non-state armed groups. They contend, firstly, that the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction maintains that IHL applies to armed groups because the 'parent' state has accepted those rules. Other arguments include the fact that individual leaders of non-state armed groups can, and have, been held accountable for war crimes. A third school of thought cites the exercise of *de facto* government functions by many armed groups, which would also bind them to IHL. Finally, some armed groups have reached a threshold of organisation, stability and control of territory, and should, as a consequence, be considered to possess international legal personality and are therefore bound by IHL (Kleffner 2011).

The various UN reports and policy also highlights the need for engagement with armed groups as endorsed in resolutions and decisions by the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly and in the Secretary-General's Reports on the protection of civilians. These reports highlight that human rights law, which governs the relationship between states and its citizens, is also applied to non-state groups that control territory and exercise state-like control.[41] While the UNICEF programme note touches on the engagement process specifically, including political analysis and modalities of engagement, it only outlines general categories of information to be considered without providing comparative case studies for practitioners to evaluate. To augment the general guidance, UNICEF has published additional checklists and tools for country offices, including, for example, analyzing

the capacity of UN country office staff.[42] While the checklists and lessons learned provide additional background, the analysis is still quite general in nature.

OCHA's "Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners" devotes more analysis to the humanitarian negotiations, delineating the process into three phases: preparation, seeking agreement and implementation, which are further subdivided into a total of nine steps.[43] Similar to UNICEF's policy, OCHA's manual frames the negotiation process within international law. Both documents also provide categories of information to be evaluated, for instance: leaders' interests, organizational structure, relationship with local communities, patterns of violence, or published doctrine. Neither document, however, provides more than a few questions for how each type of information is to be obtained or analyzed. Given the importance of analysis to the development of engagement and negotiation strategies, this lack of detail weakens subsequent steps. More detailed case studies, for example, of each element of analysis would be valuable for practitioners to better assess the group(s) in question. While each document has a different approach, the overall process for engagement can be summarized as follows:

a. Initial conflict analysis
b. Clarifying the goals and modalities of engagement
c. Internal decision-making process for engagement
d. Direct or indirect engagement with the group in question
e. Follow-up, implementation or monitoring of agreements
f. On-going monitoring of each group

Various other UN actors have generated guidelines related to this topic, including an on-going process by the UN Policy Committee under the guidance of the Secretary-General's office. DPKO has, for example, developed detailed policy on integrating local perceptions, including those from combatants and ex-combatants, in the analysis conducted by UN missions.[44] The policy highlights the influence both civil war and unconventional armed groups have on DPKO's efforts but the policy guidance often presumes staff possess the necessary analytical and negotiation skills to address this issue.[45]

The UN Secretary-General has also provided guidance on this topic through a number of reports and knowledge products, most notably, "Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities," which argues for early engagement with civil war actors and understanding rebel leadership structures to minimize spoilers in peace talks.[46] The additional resources, including the "United Nations Manual for Mediators: Advice from United Nations Representatives and Envoys" also highlight the importance of understanding non-state armed groups in building sustainable agreements.[47] Much of this policy, by its high-level nature or focus on the mediation process itself, leaves underexplored the detailed analysis and guidance on negotiation.

In addition to UN policy, other inter-governmental actors (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross - ICRC) and NGOs (e.g. Geneva Call) have published policy or research on engaging armed groups.[48] These resources provide valuable contributions to existing UN policy by adding additional analysis, including: a methodology for humanitarian access, armed group financing, implication of organizational structures, codes of conduct in armed groups, the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups, detention by armed groups and the impact of counter-insurgency strategies.[49] Of particular interest is the contribution by Deborah Mancini-Griffoli and Andre Picot in "Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict" which adapts interest-based negotiation theory to the humanitarian action.[50] It includes critical insights into the evaluation and fostering of communication channels with armed groups. While the analysis of armed group morphology or patterns of violence, as examples, and their impact on the nature and behavior of armed groups are not covered, the guidance, along with a number of similar NGO documents, are invaluable resources for the development of the learning initiative proposed in this report.[51]

CIVIL WAR LITERATURE

Research on civil war and the armed groups provides a wealth of theory and empirical studies. Research on civil wars expanded in the early 1990s as war and genocide in Bosnia (1992-1995)[52] and Rwanda (1990-1993, 1994)[53] focused political scientists' attention on intra-state conflicts.[54] These initial efforts systematized our understanding of civil wars by studying: frequency and severity,[55] economic drivers,[56]factors impacting

onset,[57] duration,[58] and outcomes.[59] This research found that existing perspectives in political science often ignored non-political factors such as economic factors, such as the presence of natural resources, that contribute to the inception and perpetuation of civil wars. As a result, scholars expanded the factors studied, including: influence of geography[60], scarcity of natural resources[61], impact of climate change[62], the role of religion[63], patterns and instrumentality of sexual violence[64], ethnicity[65] and types of warfare employed.[66] The prevalence of peace accords for ending civil wars was also studied, including: negotiating peace accords[67], impact of international aid[68], handling of break-away factions or spoilers[69]; role of third-party intervention[70]; counter-insurgency strategies[71] and post-war recovery strategies.[72]

After a decade of research by political scientists, however, civil war scholars such as Christopher Blattman, Stathis Kalyvas and Jeremy Weinstein questioned the merits of solely examining national-level variables.[73] Criticism focused on a range of assumptions these studies relied upon, including the homogeneity of non-state armed groups across contexts. For instance, the most widely cited study investigating the causes of civil war did not include any variables for the armed groups involved in each conflict focusing, instead, exclusively on characteristics of the state.[74] Subsequent micro-level studies in political science and anthropology[75] highlighted the shortcomings of macro-level analysis, leading to a new field of investigation: the microfoundations of civil war.

This new perspective was guided by the realization that rebel groups are sophisticated, self-sustaining multinational entities that survive under extreme pressure and in countries where organizations of comparable size and organizational capacity are rare.[76] These studies examined armed groups (as opposed to the state) as the unit of analysis. The subsequent research opened up a range of inquiries: strategies employed to recruit combatants[77], understanding rebel governance of civilians[78], economic models for group formation (Garfinkel 2004), prevalence of child soldiers,[79] the strategies behind violence against communities,[80] rebel fighting tactics[81], typologies of rebel groups[82], role of women combatants[83], persistence of small and lightly-armed guerrilla groups[84] and how resource and ideological endowments shaped rebel behaviour.[85]

Other social science research relevant to this scoping exercise includes: studies on cohesion in state-militaries, largely based on the "primary unit paradigm" initially conceived by Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz in a 1948 study of the German Army

at the end of World War II;[86] sociologists' studies of war and violence, specifically the evolving role of ideology and bureaucracies in the legitimization and organizational potency of warfare;[87] theories and experimental evidence identifying the cognitive and physiological mechanisms underpinning synchronous group actions and cohesion;[88] social psychological research related to social identity theory, including recent studies on Fusion theory, which investigates different patterns in individual agency within violent groups;[89] cognitive studies of cooperation and coalitional alliances, which use evolutionary game theory to examine processes of coalition formation,[90] conditional cooperation,[91] and social norm enforcement;[92] research from psychology and anthropology investigating the causal relationship between cognition, religious ritual and group morphology.[93]

RESEARCH ON GANGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Studies on organized crime and gangs have proliferated in the past years, reflecting the spread of this phenomenon to countries that until recently did not appear on the agenda of UN Security Council and other UN bodies.[94] The impact is so significant that the violence resulting from these situations exceeds many on-going civil wars. Indeed, a recent quantitative analysis of global violence indicates that only 1 out of 10 killings is the result of terrorism or armed conflict, and that more than three-quarters of worldwide fatalities occur in "non-conflict settings".[95]

Detailed research on criminal gangs and urban violence began with William Foote Whyte's (1955) study of street gangs in the Italian slums of Boston, USA. Research subsequently expanded to include substantial regional and transnational studies, including United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) regional assessments.[96] In the last two decades, however, unprecedented levels of urban violence caused by gangs and organized crime have been identified as a threat to achieving MDGs and democratic gains.[97] Similar to studies of civil war, research studied the blurring of lines between political and criminal violence and the respective actors perpetrating them.[98] As a consequence, subsequent research focused on both the levels of violence, and its underlying drivers - social, economic, cultural, political and institutional.[99] This report categorizes this research according to Moser and McIlwaine's typology, which distinguishes urban violence by its underlying motivation: political/institutional, economic and social.[100] While each category of violence does not exist in isolation,

it is helpful in disaggregating the underlying driving forces as it relates to the non-conventional groups responsible for each.[101]

Research on political/institutional drivers in Central and South America has examined the legacy of state repression in the 1970s and 1980s and the resulting "cultures of violence".[102] Importantly for this report, many non-state armed groups in Latin America emerged in reaction to this oppression or to perpetuate it (e.g. paramilitary groups loosely controlled by the government). But once established these groups were difficult to dismantle.[103] This research also examined the range of armed groups to emerge in the vacuum of state control created during this time. This has led to "a number of state, private, civic and criminal groups and institutions in many cities in the South (…) fighting for social, economic and political power within communities."[104]

The second categorization of research investigated the economic drivers of urban violence and transnational criminal enterprises.[105] Of particular interest to this report are the studies of gang recruitment, which closely parallels civil war literature on recruitment. For example, Luke Dowdney suggested that youth involved in drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro are akin to child soldiers.[106] Other studies have detailed the impact of organized crime on local and national institutions, highlighting its corrosive effects on security and governance.[107] Vigilante groups supported by the community have expanded in part as a response to this perceived lawlessness or state collusion.[108] Yet as described above in the PAGAD example, the evolution of these groups can take multiple pathways.

The third area of research studied youth gangs, examining the role of social and economic exclusion in recruitment and group formation.[109] Similar to civil war studies, this analysis argues that youth gangs, a common site in lower income neighborhoods, emerge as a result of economic inequality and social injustice.[110] This literature complements political science research on recruitment and suggests that gangs afford its members a sense of identity lacking from the fragmented social institutions of impoverished communities.[111] Embedded in this analysis is the role of gender, both in terms of masculinity and violence against women. Of particular interest to this initiative is also the research on the role of women in gangs, which warns against simple categorization of women's role as victims and men as perpetrators.[112]

TRAINING INITIATIVES

Capacity building for analyzing and engaging non-state armed groups has, to date, been largely limited to expert conferences and NGO training tailored to humanitarian negotiators.[113] For example, OCHA's manual mentioned earlier includes guidelines for humanitarian negotiations that have been used for training in a few occasions.[114] While a critical step in advancing the capacity of the UN, the course focuses heavily on the triumvirate of international law that frames humanitarian negotiations, underplaying the analytical frameworks and case studies needed to evaluate armed groups. Most humanitarian courses follow similar formats. There have also been a number of one-off courses like the collaboration between DPA and the Norwegian Defence University College on a training focused on ceasefire negotiations.[115] Most critical to this initiative is that none of these training opportunities facilitated a broader organizational learning process that captures the varied experience of UN staff.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

UN staff are engaging with an increasingly diverse set of non-state armed groups – urban gangs driving high levels of violence in Kingston or Rio de Janeiro, community-based vigilante groups in fragile states like Liberia or Timor-Leste, or state-sponsored groups perpetuating post-election violence in Kenya or Côte d'Ivoire.[116] Engagement with these groups has, however, become more complex as contact has become criminalized, further complicating UN staff's efforts in the field. Without sufficient institutional capacity to support engagement strategies, UN staff undertake analysis and negotiation in an ad hoc manner. As a consequence, field staff "often lack adequate understanding of the ANSAs [non-state armed groups] that they are seeking to engage with and are ill-prepared for the process".[117] While some capacity building opportunities exist for humanitarian personnel, very little is available to other UN agencies. More critically, these courses do not facilitate learning across the UN system and are proprietary material of the NGOs running them, making it inaccessible to most UN personnel. Moreover, developing these skills require practice and training, more than written guidance notes can offer. Given that the proliferation and evolving nature of non-state armed groups will continue to be a challenge to UN staff, the UNSSC has established a learning initiative to address this challenge: Analyzing and Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in the Field. Three interlocking processes constitute the initiative:

1. Documenting **field-oriented case studies and best practices** across the UN, including negotiation tactics, analytical frameworks and new patterns of non-state armed group engagement in the field. These in-depth studies provide comparative examples to practitioners, documenting UN efforts to address this complex issue. The documentation process, which will also tap into non-UN field practice, serves as the basis for the development of a training curriculum.

2. Initiating a **community of practice and expert reference group** constituted by practitioners, policy experts and learning specialists to advance UN thinking on this topic and develop knowledge products and training for UN staff. The UNSSC supports this community by regularly convening meetings and organizing joint events with the members of the expert reference group.

3. Establishing a web-based **Knowledge and Training Portal** that is accessible to all UN staff. The portal centralizes existing material and provides a venue for staff to share experiences. It will include, for example, a policy and training material repository and a lessons learned section featuring open-source platforms promoting collaborative editing (e.g. similar to Wikipedia). The site will also include file sharing, thus, giving access to digitally stored information, such as reports, multimedia material (audio, images and video) and discussion forums where UN staff and other practitioners can pose and respond to queries as new trends or challenges present themselves.

The initiative is shaped by three principles: inclusiveness, openness, and responsiveness.

Inclusiveness:	The initiative strives to include all key stakeholders that can contribute or benefit from its efforts
Openness:	Knowledge products, lessons-learned and training produced developed by the community of practice are open source, available to all UN staff and practitioners
Responsiveness:	The direction and evolution of the initiative is driven by its community of practice

The UNSSC initiative is a two-year programme. In Summer 2014, the terms of reference for the members of the expert reference group will be developed. Members will be drawn from across the UN system and relevant NGO networks. The group is charged with reviewing the scoping report and setting the parameters for how case studies and best practices should be documented. A high-level conference will then be organized in Winter 2014 to reflect upon UN field experiences and review the country-specific case studies and best practices. The UNSSC Peace and Security team aims to pilot a five-day training workshop and launch the Knowledge and Training Portal in 2015 to validate the course curriculum and make it available to all UN staff.

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ANNEX A

Milestones of the Scoping Process

The UNSSC is mandated to provide inter-agency training and learning within the UN system. As part of its mandate, UNSSC regularly receives requests for the development of new courses. In the last four years, it has received regular requests from UN field for capacity building on engaging non-state armed actors in the field. As a result, in January 2014 the UNSSC's Peace and Security Team developed a Concept Note that was approved by UNSSC Senior Management. On January 31, a Global online consultation was launched on several UN Communities of Practice (e.g. Coordination Practice Network, Conflict Prevention Network, Peace and Development Advisors Network, and UNDP Teamworks). In parallel, the consultation was also administered through non-UN channels like LinkedIn. The full text of the consultation can be found in Annex B. The consultation received substantial feedback from over 30 practitioners who provided substantive input to the query. The full list of contributors can be consulted in Annex C.

UNSSC Director also presented the new initiative to the Tenth Seminar for Current Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the UN Secretary-General in Montreux on 1 March 2014. The SRSGs and other UN Senior Officials welcomed UNSSC's initiative and suggested case studies be prepared to document UN practice in the field. The scoping process also included a literature review and interviews with selected stakeholders (see list of interviewees Annex D). The scoping report will be shared broadly for feedback and input. The chart below summarizes the milestones of the scoping process conducted from January to April 2014.

Concept Note: January
Global online consultation: February
Presentation at the SRSG retreat: March
Literature review: March
Interviews: March
Scoping Report: April

ANNEX B

The UNSSC Global Consultation

Text of the global online consultation launched on several UN and non-UN Communities of Practice (31 January-5 March 2014)

UNSSC CONSULTATION: "ENGAGING NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS"

The United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) is pleased to announce a new learning initiative aimed at creating awareness and building capacity to deal with the phenomenon of "Non-State Armed Groups".

Photo credits: Gideon Tsang

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: In the last decade, maintaining peace and security has become more complicated by an increase in the violence perpetrated no longer exclusively by national armies and armed oppositions but also by an increasingly assertive and brutal range of hybrid actors, such as illegal armed groups, criminal organizations, youth gangs, transnational networks of illicit trafficking, and warlords operating in countries such as Afghanistan, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Myanmar, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, and sometimes affecting entire regions such as the Sahel. The impact is so significant that the violence resulting from these situations exceeds many on-going civil wars *(UNODC, Intentional Homicide Data, 2013)*. Indeed, a recent quantitative analysis of global violence indicates that only 1 out of 10 killings is the result of terrorism or armed conflict and that more than three-quarters of worldwide fatalities occurs in allegedly "non-conflict settings" *(Global Burden of Armed Violence, 2011)*.

Understanding and engaging these new types of armed groups presents novel analytical and practical challenges for the United Nations and other international partners as these groups differ substantially from the armed groups driving civil conflicts. The definition of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) has been kept broad and loose enough to capture all different organizations that make use of violence in order to pursue goals as diverse as political power, economic return, social strife, religious mobilization, terrorism, etc. NSAGs, therefore, include organizations whose structure, goals and means are not yet well-defined and are currently referred to by using some of the following, and often overlapping, terms:

- paramilitaries
- vigilante groups
- youth gangs
- pirates
- criminal networks
- drug cartels
- warlords
- terrorist groups
- rebels and insurgent groups
- mafias
- private security companies.

ONLINE CONSULTATION: As first step of the initiative, the Staff College is launching an online consultation, which is part of an extensive scoping process aimed at collecting resources, identifying existing capacities and mapping out possible stakeholders to be involved in the next phases of the project.

Below are **3 categories of inputs** that we are currently collecting and we warmly encourage you to share:

1. Analytical frameworks and dilemmas: How can we better assess and understand the nature, structure, and internal morphology of such a broad array of Non-State Armed Groups? What analytical categories do we currently employ?

2. Operational and Field dilemmas: How do we contact, access, and engage with these groups? What types of interactions do we observe? What are the key operational challenges and pitfalls the UN and its partners are currently facing?

3. Needs and Lessons Learned from engagement: What capacities (skills, knowledge, institutions) are required in order to meaningfully engage with these increasingly critical stakeholders? What have different international organizations (humanitarian, political, developmental) learned from dealing with NSAGs?

Besides addressing the three categories of inquiry above, we would be extremely grateful if you could share the references of documents, institutions, scholars, initiatives and other resources that are related to such a critical issue.

Please send your contributions to Mr. Fabio Oliva (f.oliva@unssc.org) by February 28.

ANNEX C

List of contributors to the online consultation
(31 January - 5 March 2014)

[in chronological order]

	NAME	ORGANIZATION
1	Maria Teresa Mauro	International expert - formerly Senior Protection Officer UNHCR West Africa
2	Simon Springett	UN Resident Coordinator - Maldives & Seychelles
3	Anita Ernstorfer	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
4	Kerry Ann Jones	Specta Me
5	Dhammika Kande Vidanalage	Major, United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS)
6	Stephen E K Tambah	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) - Consolidation of Democratic Governance/Civil Affairs Section
7	Valerie Yankey-Wayne	United Nations Expert Reference Group member - CASA - International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)
8	Julie Kiwanuka	Team Leader, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
9	John Robert Cencich	Professor and Director, Center for Criminological & Forensic Sciences - California University of Pennsylvania
10	Mohamed Madhani	Deputy Director - European Department, Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11	Tim Martin	President at Diplomatic Counsel Consulting
12	Ben Miller	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
13	Stuart Curwood	Air Force Officer, Australian Defence Force
14	Fowzia Ibrahim	Project Accounts Management
15	Etienne Kuster	Academic Relations Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
16	Muhammad Feyyaz	Assistant professor, School of Governance and Society - University of Management and Technology, Lahore

17	Antonio Galli	Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (PHAP)
18	Hansueli Homberger	Consultant
19	Achim Wennmann	Geneva Peacebuilding Platform
20	Monica Rijal	Early Recovery Specialist - UNDP Myanmar
21	Rene Teijgeler	Senior Cultural Advisor - UNESCO
22	Michelle Parlevliet	International consultant
23	Aleksandra Nesic	PhD Student
24	Marshall Wallace	Consult Brevity
25	Elisabeth Decrey	President, Geneva Call
26	Maria Derks-Normandin	Senior Fellow, Centre for Security Governance
27	Ted Khan R Juanite	Magazine Mindanaw
28	Zahbia Yousuf	Conciliation Resources - Peacebuilding Editor and Analyst
29	Héloïse Ruaudel	Independent Consultant
30	Mohammad Fayyazi	UNICEF Humanitarian Policy Advisor, Office of Emergency Programmes

ANNEX D

List of people interviewed
(February-March 2014)

[in chronological order]

	NAME	ORGANIZATION
1	Maria Teresa Mauro	International expert - formerly Senior Protection Officer UNHCR West Africa
2	Monica Rijal	Early Recovery Specialist - UNDP Myanmar
3	Zahbia Yousuf	Conciliation Resources - Peacebuilding Editor and Analyst
4	Héloïse Ruaudel	Independent Consultant
5	Karen Perrin	Policy Advice Section | Policy Development & Studies Branch – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
6	Antonio Galli	Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (PHAP)
7	Enrico Bisogno	Team Leader, Crime Statistics - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
8	Dirk Druet	Coordination Officer - Policy Planning Team Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS) Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS)
9	Anita Ernstorfer	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
10	Ben Miller	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
11	Lena Slachmuijlder	Vice-President for Programmes Search of Common Ground
12	Renato Mariani	Political Affairs Officer, Policy, Planning and Mediation Support, UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

ANNEX E

Definitions of Non-state armed group

This report relies on Kalyvas' formulation of civil war as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities" (Kalyvas 2006: 34). The term sovereign entity is sufficiently broad to include modern states and colonial empires. Missing from this definition, however, is a minimum threshold for the level of violence distinguishing civil conflicts from other forms of social violence. The three research groups tracking such information have defined the value for the minimum threshold differently (Sambanis 2004). This reports relies on definitions and datasets published by Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) as its data is most widely in recent literature (Eck 2005). Moreover, the UCDP/PRIO definitions distinguish between two levels of violence – civil conflicts and civil wars providing additional analytical possibilities.

Civil conflicts as defined as internal conflicts that count at least 25 battle-deaths per year, while civil wars as incidents resulting in more than 1,000 battle deaths per annum (Harbom 2008).

A civil war armed group is defined as:

(1) An armed organization party to a civil conflict

The criterion of 25 battle-related deaths serves as a proxy for the organizational capacity to sustain violent resistance. It also mirrors the criterion used by UCDP/PRIO for what defines a civil war. This creates uniformity between how this project defines CWAGs and civil wars. This also ensures that the vast UCDP/PRIO databases can be drawn upon in this and future research.

(2) Publically declared a name and an incompatibility with the government or other civil war armed group party to the conflict.

This criterion does not distinguish between separatists and groups striving for national domination. Instead, this criterion privileges a group's organizational capacity to effectuate sufficient resources and group cohesion to sustain violent resistance.

(3) Organizations restricting the majority of their military and political efforts to influence the outcome of only one civil war.

The third and final criterion for CWAGs further refines differences in the political agenda of groups. It distinguishes those organizations limiting their military and political efforts to one civil war. This distinguishes them from organization (e.g. terrorist networks) that advocate a narrower set of issues across many conflicts or regions (Vertovec 1999). CWAGs are usually multinational (e.g. leaders residing internationally or receiving foreign support) but their political agenda is framed around the outcome of only one civil war.

A result of these criteria is the inclusion of paramilitaries within the definition of CWAG. Paramilitaries are armed non-state organizations that fight on the side of the government but operate independently from government control. Despite being party to many civil wars, paramilitaries are usually excluded from academic analysis because they are conceptualized as extensions of the state (Sanín 2008). The implication is that CWAGs are composed of two distinct subsets of armed groups, those opposing the state and those supporting it. Based on the three criteria above, Table 1 shows in summary form why certain types of armed groups have been included or excluded from this project. The shaded area represents those organizations that qualify for this study. In order to distinguish between pro- and anti-government groups a fourth column was added to distinguish between challengers to state authority, supporters of state authority, or other (societal parasites).

Table 1. Areas shaded in grey denote non-state armed groups classified as CWAGs

ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE/TERM	CRITERION 1 25-BATTLE DEATHS	CRITERION 2 PUBLICALLY DECLARED NAME	CRITERION 3 NATIONAL OR TRANSNATIONAL	CRITERION 4 CHALLENGER, SUPPORTER, OR PARASITIC
REBELS, GUERRILLAS, INSURGENTS	Yes	Yes	National	Challenger
PARAMILITARIES	Yes	Yes	National	Supporter
TERRORISTS (NATIONALLY FOCUSED)	Yes	Yes	National	Challenger
TERRORIST NETWORKS	Yes/No	Yes	Transnational	Challenger
URBAN GANGS	Yes/No	No	National	Parasitic
CRIMINAL SYNDICATES	Yes/No	No	Transnational	Parasitic

ANNEX F

Official UN Documents and Reports

The following list highlights key policy documents and supplementary reading. It is compiled from various UN guidance notes.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977

ICRC Customary Law Database

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

The Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989)

Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2002)

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002)

UN DOCUMENTS

Security Council Resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011)

Security Council Resolutions on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict

Security Council Presidential Statement and Aide Memoire (Annex) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (14 January 2009)

General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991)

Millennium Development Goals Declaration, Keeping the Promise (GA 2010)

UNICEF DOCUMENTS

The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007)

The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa (1997)

The Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (April 2010)

The UNICEF Enterprise Risk Management Policy

Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Child Rights Violations in Situations of Armed Conflict (MRM)

Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming (HRBAP)

Non-Paper on Policy Issues Affecting UNICEF Humanitarian Action in Complex Threat Environments (October 2010)

OCHA DOCUMENTS

Manual on Humanitarian Access (forthcoming)

Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (OCHA, 2003)

Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual and Guidelines for Practitioners (OCHA, 2006)

Mancini-Griffoli, Deborah and Picot, Andre, "Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict," Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, October, 2004

ENDNOTES

1 For the purpose of this report, non-state armed groups are defined as: "organizations that are party to an armed conflict, but do not answer to, and are not commanded by, one or more states" (Bernard 2011:262). For references to UN effectiveness as it relates to non-state armed groups, see, UN Secretary-General's reports: "Enhancing mediation and its support activities" or "Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution" (see Annex G for full references).

2 For a review of current conceptualization of non-state armed groups see: Podder (2012) and Hofmann and Schneckener (2011). In this report, in order to reduce repetition, the term "armed group" and "armed organization" are used interchangeably. Similarly, insurgents and rebel groups are treated synonymously, as are criminal organizations and gangs.

3 (Jackson 2012:2–4)

4 (Cole and McQuinn 2014)

5 Created in 2002 as the "institution for system-wide knowledge management, training and continuous learning for the staff of the United Nations system," UNSSC builds bridges across the UN system as one of its corporate priorities. UNSSC regularly conducts horizon-looking scanning and system-wide thematic inquiries, with the aim of exploring emerging issues and providing the necessary skills for UN staff to address them.

6 (World Health Organization 2010)

7 In this report the definition for armed violence draws upon the Secretary General's Report on "Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence", which defines it as: "the intentional use of physical force, threatened or actual, with arms, against oneself, another person, group, community or State that results in loss, injury, death and/or psychosocial harm to an individual or individuals and that can undermine a community's, country's or region's security and development achievements and prospects" (United Nations 2009:para 5). Other definitions include OECD definition: the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development (OECD 2009: 28); or Geneva Declaration's wording: "the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives against a person, group, community, or state, which undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development" (Geneva Declaration 2008: 10).

8 For additional background see: (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Fearon 2003; Kalyvas 2006)

9 (Harbom 2007)

10 (Anant 2011:2)

11 (Bernard 2011:261; Hofmann and Schneckener 2011:601–603; Kalyvas 2006)

12 To reduce repetition for the reader, the term "armed group" and "armed organization" or "criminal organization" are used interchangeably in this report.

13 Civil war armed groups are defined as non-state armed groups that meet the following three criteria: (1) An armed organization party to a civil conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year; (2) have publically declared a name and an incompatibility with a government or other civil war armed group party to a conflict; (3) restrict the majority of its military and political efforts to influence the outcome of only one civil war. See Annex E for further details.

14 (United Nations 2009)

15 (Geneva Declaration 2011:1–3)

16 (Geneva Declaration 2011:5) For additional research of Tanzania, see Phillipo Chalya and Japhet Gilyoma's study of injuries in a north-western city in Tanzania (Chalya and Gilyoma 2012)

17 (Geneva Declaration 2011; United Nations 2009)

18 (Zaluar 2010:15)

19 (Grant 2014) For additional background on the ceasefire see (Whitfield 2013)

20 Non-conventional armed groups are defined as those groups (e.g. gangs, criminal networks, organized crime) that are responsible for levels of violence that account for rates of armed violence comparable to civil wars but are not defined as such because the groups do not publicly declare an incompatibility with the government. For additional detail, see (Briscoe 2013).

21 For additional research on the reach of cartels and street gangs see, (Rodgers and Muggah 2009:301–303).

22 (Rodgers and Muggah, 2010; Hazen 2010)

23 (Human Rights Watch 2010; International Crisis Group 2005, 2007; Pecaut 1999; Saab 2009; Sanin 2008)

24 (Winton 2004:171)

25 (Podder 2012; United Nations 2009)

26 (Podder 2012:5)

27 (Hough 2000:68)

28 (Whitfield 2010:6)

29 See, for example, the Secretary-General's report on armed violence (see Annex G).

30 (Jackson 2012)

31 (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012)

32 (Jackson 2012)

33 See ODI's Humanitarian negotiations with armed non-state actors programme. http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/2430-humanitarian-negotiations-non-state-armed-militia-rebel (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012; Jackson 2012)

34 For examples see: OCHA's manuals (McHugh and Bessler 2006a, 2006b) or UNICEF's programme guidance (UNICEF 2011)

35 (McHugh and Bessler 2006b)

36 For example, see the DPKO's guidance note (United Nations 2008).

37 Telephone interview with UNDP representative, March 2014

38 (UNICEF 2011)

39 For examples see: OCHA's guidelines (McHugh and Bessler 2006a, 2006b); ICRC's published research (Bernard 2011); NGO guidance includes studies conducted by Geneva Call (Bongard 2013); Overseas Development Institute (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012; Jackson 2012); Conciliation Resources (Ricigliano 2005); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Mancini-griffoli and Picot 2004).

40 See Annex F for additional supplemental reading on applicable international law.

41 For additional background, see: (Clapham 2006)

42 For a list of additional guidelines see Annex F or http://www.unicefinemergencies.com/downloads/eresource/Engaging%20with%20Non-State%20Entities.html.

43 See (McHugh and Bessler 2006)

44 (United Nations 2013)

45 For example, see DPKO's policy on "United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions" (2014).

46 (United Nations 2009: 10-11)

47 (United Nations 2012) See also: the Special Envoy Briefing Package, the United Nations Manual for Mediators: advice from United Nations Representatives and Envoys, and the Mediation Start-up Guidelines. For a complete list of the resources and applicable UN resolutions, see: http://peacemaker.un.org/resources/key-un-documents.

48 For examples see: ICRC's published research (Bernard 2011); NGO guidance includes studies conducted by Geneva Call (Bongard 2013); Overseas Development Institute (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012; Jackson 2012); Conciliation Resources (Ricigliano 2005); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Mancini-griffoli and Picot 2004).

49 See *International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 93 (882) - Vol 93 (883)*

50 (Mancini-griffoli and Picot 2004)

51 (Bongard 2013; Holmqvist 2005)

52 For additional background see: Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short history. NYU Press, 1996; Chandler, David. *Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton.* Pluto Press, 2000; Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention.* ME Sharpe, 2000;

53 For additional background see: Prunier, Gérard. *The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide.* Columbia University Press, 1995; Mamdani, Mahmood. *When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton University Press, 2001.

54 (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011; Kalyvas 2012)

55 (Collier 1998; Eck 2005; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007; Gleditsch et al. 2002)

56 (Collier 1999)

57 Collier et al. 2004; Fearon et al. 2007

58 (Collier et al. 2004; de Rouen and Sobek 2004; Hegre 2004)

59 (Cunningham 2009; Cunningham et al. 2009; de Rouen and Sobek 2004; Licklider 1995)

60 (H. Buhaug and Lujala 2005)

61 (Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2001; Ross 2004)

62 (Burkea et al. 2009)

63 (Stewart 2009)

64 (Snyder et al. 2006; Wood 2006)

65 (Fearon et al. 2007)

66 (Balcells and Kalyvas 2007)

67 (Darby 2001)

68 (Collier et al. 2003)

69 (Borer et al. 2006; Kydd and Walter 2003)

70 (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Diehla et al. 2009; Regan 1996, 2002; Regan et al. 2009; N. Sambanis 2008)

71 (Petraeus, Nagl, and Amos 2007)

72 (Collier et al. 2003; Mueller 2003)

73 (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007)

74 (Fearon and Laitin 2003)

75 See for example, (Lan 1985; Richards 1996)

76 (Blattman and Miguel 2010: 25) See also Simpson 2012

77 (Arjona and Kalyvas 2006; Gates 2002; Weinstein 2005)

78 (Arjona 2005)

79 (Gates and Reich 2009)

80 (Gates 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007)

81 (Kalyvas 2003)

82 (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009)

83 (Kunz and Sjöberg 2009)

84 (Fearon 2008)

85 (Weinstein 2007)

86 While writers like Clausewitz (1976), Sun Tzu (Tzu 1963) or Machiavelli (Machiavelli 2008) first discussed cohesion in military units, it was not until Shils and Janowitz's (1948) empirical study of German units at the end of World War II that this topic was investigated systematically. Shils and Janowitz developed the "primary unit paradigm," which still remains the dominant conceptualization of cohesion in military units (MacCoun et al. 2006; Siebold 2010).

87 Contemporary sociologists have largely ignored the study of war (Maleševic 2010: 11). Exceptions include studies of revolution (see Moore 1966; Tilly 1978, 1985, 1990; Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991); genocide (see Bauman 1989; Chalk 1990; Powell 2011); policing and surveillance (Giddens 1985; Lyon 2001); organized crime (Abadinsky 2010; Gambetta 2000, 2009) and sociospatial networks of power (Mann 1986).

88 Anthropologists and sociologists have long speculated that group actions employing synchronous activities strengthen group cohesion (Durkheim 1915; Radcliffe-Brown 1922). Yet it has only been in the last decade that lab experiments have identified the cognitive and physiological mechanisms driving these earlier insights (Cohen et al. 2010; Hove and Risen 2009; Lakens 2010; Macrae et al. 2008; Miles et al. 2010a; Miles et al. 2010b; Paladino et al. 2010; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009).

89 Social identity theory emerged to explain why the arbitrary placement of individuals into two different groups produced intergroup discrimination (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). Tajfel and Turner argued that the participants in their experiments adopted the identity of whatever group they were assigned. The introduction of Fusion theory by William Swann and colleagues four decades later adapts social identity theory to explain acts of terrorism and the willingness of group members to make profound sacrifices for groups (Swann et al. 2009, 2012; Gómez et al. 2011).

90 Social cognition of coalitional alliances (SCCA) theorists argue that the tendency of individuals to affirm in-group values when under duress is best explained as a cognitive adaptation: when faced with dangers better addressed through cooperation, individuals will exhibit in-group affiliation behaviours to increase the chance others will come to their aid (Navarrete and Fessler 2005: 307).

91 Conditional cooperation theory explains how collective action problems are addressed in larger groups (Boyd and Richerson 1992). The norm of conditional cooperation prescribes that individuals are likely to cooperate only if other members of a group do and will defect when others defect (Abel and Reyniers 2000). For a review of sanctions see Yamagishi (1988) and Fehr (2000); third-party punishment Fehr and Fischbacher (2004); and for a summary of recent studies see Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) or Ostrom (2000).

92 The capacity for humans to cooperate with genetically unrelated individuals (e.g. not kin) is unique (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Of particular interest to the study of armed groups is the role of coercive forces in the conceptualization and maintenance of social norms of cooperation (Abel and Reyniers 2000).

93 While anthropologists have long understood that rituals play a role in building social cohesion and collective identity, new theories from the cognitive science of religion have begun to examine this dynamic more rigorously (Atran 2002; Boyer 2001; Sosis and Ruffle 2003; Wilson 2002).

94 For a review, see (Winton 2005; Gambetta 2009; Abadinsky 2009; United Nations 2009).

95 (Geneva Declaration 2011)

96 For regional studies see UNODC's threat assessments for Eastern Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, West Africa (Assessment 2012; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013a, 2013b).

97 (Podder 2012; Vigil 2003)

98 (Winton 2005; Cockayne 2013)

99 (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004)

100 (Moser and McIlwaine 2004)

101 (Winton 2004)

102 (Koonings and Kruijt 1999)

103 (International Crisis Group 2007)

104 (Winton 2004:169)

105 (Moser Winton 2002)

106 (Dowdney 2003)

107 (Rodgers 2003)

108 (USDS 2002)

109 (Moser and McIlwaine 2000)

110 (Vanderschueren 1996: 93)

111 (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002: 27)

112 (Cornwall 2000)

113 For an example see an expert seminar hosted by German GTZ entitled, "Engagement with Non-State Armed Groups in Peace Processes" or the Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection's Engaging Armed Groups in the Protection of Civilians (http://phap.org/events/training).

114 See (McHugh and Bessler 2006a, 2006b) and Conflict Dynamics International http://www.cdint.org/humanitarian-negotiations.htm

115 For example, see The United Nations Ceasefire Mediation and Management Course in Oslo.

116 (Geneva Declaration 2011:Chpt 1)

117 For further details on this evaluation, see Overseas Development Institute's Humanitarian negotiations with armed non-state actors project: http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/2430-humanitarian-negotiations-non-state-armed-militia-rebel

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